Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital

6. Gross, Net, and New Job Creation by Entrepreneurs. Joint with Thomas Åstebro.
Journal of Business Venturing Insights 8:64-70, 2017.
“We analyze the gross (including the founders), net (excluding the founders), and new (jobs to the former unemployed or those outside the labor force) job creation by entrepreneurs two and six years after start-up.The average entrepreneur does not create any jobs for any other than him/herself, and typically arrives from having another job. Thus, short-term job creation by entrepreneurs involves a reshuffling of jobs from older to new firms rather than creating new jobs.”
[ Published version ] [ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

5. Experience and Entrepreneurship: A Career Transition Perspective. Joint with Christopher Rider, Peter Thompson, and Aleksandra Kacperczyk.
“Accumulating labor market experience first increases the probability of becoming an entrepreneur and then decreases it. The reason is that more experience generates more entrepreneurial ideas, but it also leads to better job offers from established firms as they become more certain about the skills of the potential entrepreneur.”
[ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

4. Hierarchies and Entrepreneurship. Joint with Thomas Åstebro and Peter Thompson.
European Economic Review 89:129–147, 2016.
“Firms with flatter hierarchies tend to spawn more entrepreneurs. Part of the reason is selection. Flatter firms have workers that dislike hierarchies and like entrepreneurship. Another explanation is that firms are knowledge hierarchies. For a given size flatter firms then have more knowledgeable workers who are likely to be successful in entrepreneurship.”
Published version ] [ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

3. Acquisitions, Entry, and Innovation in Oligopolistic Network Industries. Joint with Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Lars Persson.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 37:1–12, 2014.
“Network effects and installed bases of incumbent firms create barriers to entry that discourages innovation. But when entrepreneurs develop innovations to sell out to incumbents instead of entering the market, network effects and installed bases encourages innovation.”
[ Published version ] [ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

2. Riskkapital till entreprenörer: Vilken roll spelar finansmarknaderna, skattepolitiken och arbetsmarknadsregleringarna?
In Swedish Economic Forum Report 2013: Institutioner och Incitament för Innovation, edited by Pontus Braunerhjelm, 31–44. Stockholm: Entreprenörskapsforum.
[ Published version ] [ Swedish summary ]

1. Institutions and Venture Capital. Joint with Josh Lerner.
Industrial and Corporate Change 22:153–182, 2013.
“Institutions matter for the development of local venture capital markets. Taxation, labor market regulations, and legal environment are of most importance. The Swedish venture capital market developed 20 years later than the US one, likely because of a worse institutional environment.”
[ Published version (open source) ] [ Swedish summary ]

Labor (and Finance)

3. Equal Opportunity? Gender Gaps in CEO Appointments and Executive Pay. Joint with Matti Keloharju and Samuli Knüpfer.
“Gender gaps in Sweden are 18% for CEO appointments and 27% for pay. At most one-eighth of the gender gaps can be attributed to observable gender differences in executives’ and their firms’ characteristics. Unobservable gender differences in characteristics are unlikely to account for the remaining gaps, suggesting that that male and female executives neither have equal opportunities to reach the top nor are they equally paid.”
[ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

2. Private Equity, Layoffs, and Job Polarization Joint with Martin Olsson.
Journal of Labor Economics 35:697–754, 2017.
“Explanations for job polarization also explain layoffs after private equity buyouts. Buyouts reduce agency problems, which triggers automation and offshoring. Unemployment incidence doubles for workers in less productive firms who perform routine or offshorable job tasks. Job polarization is also much more marked among workers affected by buyouts than for the economy at large.”
[ Published version ] [ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

1. Production Hierarchies in Sweden.
Economics Letters 121:210–213, 2013.
“Occupation data can be used to create meaningful proxies for hierarchies within firms. Here is how to do it.”
[ Published version (open source) ] [ Swedish summary ]

Industrial Organization, Private Equity Buyouts, and Public Firms

6. Aktiemarknadens betydelse för näringslivet och samhällsekonomin. With Nikita Koptyug, Lars Persson, and Roger Svensson.
Ekonomisk Debatt (forthcoming).

5. Private Equity’s Unintended Dark Side: On the Economic Consequences of Excessive Delistings. Joint with Alexander Ljungqvist and Lars Persson.
“Over the past two decades, private equity has contributed to a shrinking of the U.S. stock market. We develop a political economy model of private equity activity to study the wider economic consequences of this trend. We show that private equity firms could inadvertently impose an externality on the economy by reducing citizen-investors’ exposure to corporate profits and thus undermining popular support for business-friendly policies. This can lead to long-term reductions in aggregate investment, productivity, and employment.”
[ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

4. Cross-Border Acquisitions and Restructuring: Multinational Enterprises versus Private Equity Firms. Joint with Selva Basiki, Pehr-Johan Norbäck, and Lars Persson.
European Economic Review 94:166–184, 2017.
“A large share of cross-border acquisitions are undertaken by private equity firms and not by traditional multinational enterprises. We develop a model that predicts when a private equity firm and when a multinational firm acquires a foreign firm. Stronger firm-specific synergies, lower restructuring advantages for PE-firms, higher exit costs for PE-firms, better access to internal capital markets, a higher risk premium on lending, higher moral hazard problems, and higher trade costs all favor MNEs over PE-firms.”
[ Published version ] [ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

3. When Does the Debt Tax Shield Distort Ownership Efficiency? Joint with Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Lars Persson.
Revise and resubmit to International Review of Economics & Finance.
“The tax laws of most developed countries are debt biased since firms can deduct interest on debt but not on equity. This bias is known to distort investment decisions. Yet, we show that assets still end up with the socially preferred owner when differences in financial and productive expertise between bidders is small and better financial expertise reduces expected bankruptcy costs.” 
[ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

2. Buying to Sell: Private Equity Buyouts and Industrial Restructuring. Joint with Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Lars Persson.
Revise and resubmit to Canadian Journal of Economics.
“Temporary ownership by private equity firms in oligopolistic markets lead to excessive investments in governance and the restructuring of target firms. The reason is that trade sale prices are more responsive to investments than product market profits.”
[ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

1. The Real Effects of Private Equity Buyouts.
In The Oxford Handbook of Private Equity, edited by Douglas Cumming, 269–299. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[ Published version ] [ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

Regulation of Media, Telecom, and ICT

9. International Network Competition under Decentralized Regulation. Joint with Thomas Tangerås.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 47:152–185, 2016.
“When telecom markets are international, national regulatory agencies set too high termination rates from a total welfare perspective. Centralization of regulation, cross-border mergers of telecom firms, and deregulation of the telecom market can help fix the problem.”
[ Published version ] [ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

8. Net Neutrality and Net Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts. Joint with Nicholas Economides.
In Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet, edited by Ian Brown, 121–143. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
[ Published version ] [ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

7. Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis. Joint with Nicholas Economides.
Information Economics and Policy 24:91–104, 2012.
“Analyses of network neutrality regulations need to account for the two-sidedness of the market: internet service providers connect end users with content providers. Cross-group externalities in such a market provide a possible rationale for network neutrality regulations.”
[ Published version ] [ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

6. Modeling the welfare effects of network neutrality regulation: A response to Caves’ comment. Joint with Nicholas Economides.
Information Economics and Policy 24: 293, 2012.
Published version ]

5. Book Review: Antitrust and Regulation in the EU and US: Legal and Economic Perspectives. Joint with Lars Persson
Journal of Economic Literature 48:1051–105, 2010.
[ Published version ]

4. Paying to Remove Advertisements.
Information Economics and Policy 21: 245–252, 2009.
“Media firms sometimes allow consumers to pay to remove advertisements from an ad-based product. Introducing this option increases advertising quantity in the free ad-based version and can lead too much advertising from a social welfare perspective.”
[ Published version ] [ Latest working paper ] [ Swedish summary ]

3. Competing Platforms and Third-party Application Developers.
Communication & Strategies 74: 95-114, 2009.
“Technology firms often decide between being open or closed to third-party application development. Firms might prefer to restrict third-party application development despite the fact that allowing it is free and increases the value of the product to consumers. The reason is that restricting third party application development removes network effects and thereby relaxes competition between platforms.”
[ Published version ] [ Swedish summary ]

2. Policies och Regleringar i Telekommunikations-, Media- och Teknologiindustrierna.
Ekonomiska Samfundets Tidsskrift 2/09: 83-87, 2009
[ Published version ]

1. Essays on Platforms: Business Strategies, Regulation, and Policy in Telecommunications, Media and Technology Industries.
Economics and Society, Hanken School of Economics, 2008.
[ Published version ]